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LANGUAGE THAT LIMITS EMPLOYER
LIABILITY IN MASSACHUSETTS
JOHN J. FERRITER'"
INTRODUCrION"''''

As a general rule, people should choose their words carefully.
However, where employment law is concerned, this maxim is criti
cal. Cases have been decided based entirely upon the use of spe
cific words in an employment relationship. This Article addresses
various methods of avoiding employer liability throughout the em
ployment relationship, and includes discussions of employer con
duct: during the solicitation of employees, during the interviewing
process, during employment, and after the employment of a partic
ular individual ends. What follows is a discussion of language em
ployers should use, language employers should avoid, and
suggestions intended to help employers legally obtain information
about employees, simply by using the proper language.
I.

HELP WANTED ADVERTISEMENTS

Employers frequently solicit employees through the use of help
wanted advertisements. However, such advertisements, if improp
erly drafted, may expose employers to potential liability. Help
wanted advertisements present the unusual situation in which an
employer attempts to present a position in a favorable light while at
the same time seeking to avoid liability. For example, an employer
does not want to commit to so many details that the advertisement
presents a legal "offer" that can be legally "accepted" simply by
filling out the application. If such an "offer" were presented, basic
* Senior Partner in the Law firm of Lyon, Ferriter & Fitzpatrick, LLP based in
Holyoke, Massachusetts. J.D., Western New England College School of Law; B.A.,
College of the Holy Cross. The author is a member of the American, Massachusetts,
and Hampden County Bar Associations, the American Trial Lawyers Association, and
the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. In addition, the author is a frequent
lecturer for the Council on Education in Management, the Lorman Business Center,
and Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc. The author wishes to express his
gratitude to Nicholle R. Proulx for her contributions to this Article.
*'" Parallel citations have been added to this Article for the convenience of
Massachusetts' practitioners.
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contract principles would allow acceptance according to the terms
of the advertisement. 1
Fortunately for employers, the general rule is that an advertise
ment will not constitute an offer.2 However, courts in some states
have held that help wanted advertisements containing specific
te~s may bind employers to the language of the advertisement. 3
In fact, even ambiguous language has been construed against em
ployers in certain jurisdictions. 4
Not only do preparers of help wanted advertisements need to
be aware of the specificity of language used, but they must also ex
ercise care to avoid language that could be construed as discrimina
tory. "It is well settled that Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act]
prohibits an employer from indicating a preference based on sex in
its advertisements .... "5 However, there is some question as to
whether employers can use sex-referent language such as "patrol
man" or "metermaid" when soliciting employees. 6 Due to this un
certainty, an employer's best course of action may be to replace all
such terminology with sex-neutral terms.
Another area of concern arises in the context of individuals
with disabilities. For instance, employers must ensure that posi
tions, as advertised, are accessible to all individuals, including those
with disabilities.? In fact, employers must ensure that the adver
1. See ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAcrs § 41, at 68 (one vol. ed.1952)
("When an offer has been made by publication, to a large number of unidentified per
sons, a power of acceptance is created in all those who read it.").
2. See id. § 25, at 43 ("It is quite possible to make a definite and operative offer
... by advertisement, in a newspaper ... or on a placecard in a store window. It is not
customary to do this, however, and the presumption is the other way.").
3. See Willis v. Allied Insulation Co., 174 So. 2d 858, 860-61 (La. Ct. App. 1965)
(deciding that a newspaper help wanted advertisement reading "[p]rofessional training
program w/$450.00 monthly guarantee if qualified" constituted a binding employment
contract when the plaintiff answered the advertisement and was accepted for the
position).
4. See id. at 861 (citing Johnson v. Capital City Ford Co., 85 So. 2d 75 (La. Ct.
App. 1955)).
5. EEOC: Policy Guide on Sex-Referent Language in Job Advertising, 8 Lab. ReI.
Rep. (BNA) (405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.) 6847, 6847 (Apr. 16,1990) [hereinafter EEOC
Policy Guide]; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
6. See EEOC Policy Guide, supra note 5, at 6847-48. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission appears to believe that the use of some terms, such as "chair
man," may be acceptable. This stems from the fact that such terms have gained a collo
quial status wherein they are frequently used to refer to any individual, male or female.
See id. at 6847. However, use of terms which can be interpreted solely as applying to
one sex may be deemed discriminatory. See id. at 6847 n.2 (using the terms "waitress"
and "waiter" as examples).
.
7. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(3) (1996).
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tisements themselves are accessible to those with disabilities; it
should be noted that there is no obligation, in advance, to provide
advertisements in various formats, but employers must make acces
sible formats available upon request. s
Unless preparers of help wanted advertisements address these
concerns, employer liability may exist. In fact, after employers re
ceive responses from prospective employees, they must continue to
exercise care during the application process as well. The following
section discusses specific instances of the application process where
there exists the potential for employer liability.
II.

EMPLOYMENT ApPLICATIONS

An employment application is a device that employers use to
gather important, usually personal, information about prospective
employees. Unfortunately for employers, a number of federal and
state laws limit the type of information that an employment applica
tion may seek to obtain. 9 As a result, requesting certain improper
information can subject an employer to liability.
While not all inclusive, information that employers should ex
ercise care in inquiring about during the application and hiring
processes are discussed in the following sections. Among the areas
where care must be exercised are the following: criminal records, lie
detector tests, commercial vehicle operation experience, and volun
teer work.
A.

Criminal Records

Many employers attempt to discover whether an applicant for
employment has a criminal record. However, it is important to re
alize that if an application asks about criminal convictions, the ap
plication also must include the following language:
"An applicant for employment with a sealed record on file with
the commissioner of probation may answer 'no record' with re
spect to an inquiry herein relative to prior arrests, criminal court
appearances or convictions. An applicant for employment with a
sealed record on file with the commissioner of probation may an
swer 'no record' to an inquiry herein relative to prior arrests or
8. See EEOC: Technical Assistance on Title I of ADA, 8 Lab. ReI. Rep. (BNA)
(405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.) 6981, 7027 (Jan. 27, 1992) [hereinafter ADA Assistance
Manual].
9. See infra Part II.A-E for a discussion of the limits on information which an
application may seek to obtain.
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criminal court appearances. In addition, any applicant for em
ployment may answer 'no record' with respect to any inquiry rel
ative to prior arrests, court appearances and adjudications in all
cases of delinquency or as a child in need of services which did
not result in a complaint transferred to the superior court for
criminal prosecution."lO
Under Massachusetts law, it is unlawful for an employer to in
quire about an applicant's criminal history unless the employer lim
its his inquiry to criminal conduct that occurred within five years of
the time of application. l l After five years, the applicant has a right
to withhold such information from the employer if the applicant so
chooses. In regard to past criminal conduct, the General Laws of
Massachusetts provide that it shall be unlawful
[f]or an employer, himself or through his agent, in connection
with an application for employment ... to request any informa
tion, to make or keep a record of such information, to use any
form of application or application blank which requests such in
formation, or to exclude, limit or otherwise discriminate against
any person by reason of his or her failure to furnish such infor
mation through a written application or oral inquiry or otherwise
regarding: (i) an arrest, detention, or disposition regarding any
violation of law in which no conviction resulted, or (ii) a first
conviction for any of the following misdemeanors: drunkenness,
simple assault, speeding, minor traffic violations, affray, or distur
bance of the peace, or (iii) any conviction of a misdemeanor
where the date of such conviction or the completion of any pe
riod of incarceration resulting therefrom, whichever date is later,
occurred five or more years prior to the date of such application
for employment or such request for information, unless such per
son has been convicted of any offense within five years immedi
ately preceding the date of such application for employment or
such request for information. 12
Accordingly, it is unlawful to elicit such information from the
applicant.
Nonetheless, it is not unlawful for an employer to gather the
same information through the use of the Criminal History Systems
Board, a board established by the laws of Massachusetts to exercise
10. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (1996). It should be noted that the repeti
tive language of the statute stems from a poorly drafted amendment to the provision in
1973. See An Act Providing for the Sealing of Certain Records of Conviction for the
Possession of Marihuana, 1973 Mass. Acts 1164.
11. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, §4(9) (1996).
12. [d.
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control over the criminal offender record information system and
access to this information. 13 Under the Criminal Offenders Record
Information Act ("CORI Act"),14 eligibility to receive such infor
mation is limited to law enforcement officials and some potential
employers. 15 If the board determines that the need for criminal rec
ord information outweighs the individual's privacy and security in
terests, the board will certify a requesting employer eligible to
receive such information. 16 In Bynes v. School Committee,17 two
school bus drivers were terminated because of their past criminal
records. 1s The school committee had requested criminal records
from the Criminal History Systems Board, pursuant to the CORI
Act, for each of the districts' bus drivers. 19 The plaintiffs contended
that the school committee violated chapter 151B, section 4(9) of the
General Laws of Massachusetts, when it sought information under
the CORI Act. 20 However, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court disagreed with the plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute,
choosing instead to interpret the statute narrowly.21 The court held
that the legislative intent of the statute was "merely to protect em
ployees from requests from their employers and not to proscribe
employers from seeking such information elsewhere. "22 Thus, it is
clear that if an employer wishes to lawfully retrieve the criminal
histories of its applicants or employees while avoiding liability, the
employer must do so by means other than inquiring with the em
ployee directly.
B.

Polygraph Tests

In certain circumstances, employers may wish to inquire about
a prospective employee's past through the use of a polygraph, or lie
detector, test in order to assess the honesty and trustworthiness of
the applicant. In Massachusetts, however, it is unlawful to request
13. See Bynes v. School Comm., 411 Mass. 264, 268-69, 581 N.E.2d 1019, 1021-22
(1991); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 168 (1996).
14. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, §§ 167-172 (1996).
15. See id. § 172.
16. See id. § 172; see'also Bynes, 411 Mass. at 265, 581 N.E.2d at 1020.
17. 411 Mass. 264, 581 N.E.2d 1019 (1991).
18. See id. at 264-65, 581 N.E.2d at 1020.
19. See id. at 265, 581 N.E.2d at 1020.
20. See id. at 266-67, 581 N.E.2d at 1020-21.
21. See id. at 267, 581 N.E.2d at 1021.
22. Id. at 268, ;;81 N.E.2d at 1021.
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that an applicant undergo such a test. 23 In fact, employment appli
cations are required to include the following language: "It is unlaw
ful in Massachusetts to require or administer a lie detector test as a
condition of employment or continued employment. An employer
who violates this law shall be subject to criminal penalties and civil
liability."24
Federal law also prohibits employers engaged in or affecting
commerce25 from compelling employees or applicants to submit to
a lie detector test. 26 Further, federal law makes it unlawful for an
employer to use, accept, refer to, or inquire concerning the results
of such tests. Federal law exempts certain employers from these
prohibitions: government employers, national defense and security
employers, FBI contractors, security services, and employers au
thorized to manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled
substances. 27
Under federal law, an employer may request an employee to
submit to a lie detector test if it is administered pursuant to an
ongoing investigation involving economic injury or loss to the em
ployer's business, if the employee had access to the property in
question, and there is a reasonable suspicion that the employee was
involved in the injury or 10ss.28 Before such a polygraph test may
be administered, the employer must provide the employee with a
statement setting forth the incident being investigated, a description
of the employer's reasonable suspicions, and a statement indicating
the employee's access to the property.29
23. Chapter 149, section 19B(1) of the General Laws of Massachusetts defines lie
detector tests as
any test utilizing a polygraph or any other device, mechanism, instrument or
written examination, which is operated, or the results of which are used or
interpreted by an examiner for the purpose of purporting to assist in or enable
the detection of deception, the verification of truthfulness, or the rendering of
a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty of an individual.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 19B(1) (1996).
24. Id. § 19B(2)(b).
25. The phrase "engaged in or affecting commerce" has historically been inter
preted broadly so that courts will almost always determine that an employer is engaged
in or affecting commerce. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (interpreting a statute regulating all activity that affects interstate
commerce as showing congressional intent to reach as far as the commerce clause per
mits, and holding that the commerce clause permits Congress to forbid a policy of seg
regation, even at a local hotel).
26. See 29 U.S.c. §§ 2001-2009 (1994).
27. See id. § 2006.
28. See id. § 2006(d).
29. See id.
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Violations of the polygraph laws carry different penalties at the
state and federal level. For violating Massachusetts law, an em
ployer subjects itself to fines of not less than $300 nor more than
$1,500, and possible imprisonment for not more than 90 days, de
pending on the number of offenses. 30 Under federal law, a $10,000
penalty can be assessed against an employer for unlawfully compel
ling polygraphs.31 As such, the employer would be well advised to
take caution and seek legal counsel before requiring an employee
or potential employee to submit to a polygraph examination.
C.

Commercial Motor Vehicle Operators

In certain circumstances, an application may ask about the ap
plicant's commercial motor vehicle experience. These applications
usually ask for a list of employers for whom the applicant has
worked as a commercial motor vehicle operator during the past ten
years, including the dates of employment and reasons for leaving. 32
Employers typically require verification of the applicant's commer
cial motor vehicle work experience in order to protect themselves
from liability created by Massachusetts statutes.
Specifically, chapter 90F, section 4 of the General Laws of
Massachusetts makes an employer liable for knowingly allowing,
permitting, or authorizing any applicant to operate a commercial
motor vehicle during any period in which the driver has lost the
privilege in any state to drive a commercial motor vehicle. The stat
ute mandates that the employer must "knowingly" authorize such a
violation,33 and therefore employers must educate themselves as to
an applicant's legitimate qualifications to operate a commercial mo
tor vehicle. To avoid "knowingly" violating the statute, employers
should require applicants to certify the truthfulness of information
given regarding the past operation of commercial motor vehicles.
Requiring such certification from the applicant is evidence that the
employer affirmatively exercised reasonable diligence to ensure
that the applicant possessed a valid, active license to operate a com
mercial motor vehicle, thereby negating the inference that the em
ployer "knowingly" violated the statute.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 19B(3) (1996).
See 29 V.S.c. § 2005(a)(1).
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90F, § 4 (1996).
Id.
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Volunteer Work

Employment applications often ask about a candidate's prior
work history. Massachusetts law mandates that applications asking
about a prior work history must affirmatively state that the appli
cant is permitted to include volunteer work that may be verified as
part of the applicant's work history.34
Beyond this application stage of the employment relationship,
there remains the potential for employer liability. For instance, fol
lowing the application process, employers typically interview pro
spective employees, and in so doing, subject themselves to potential
liability. The following sections describe the proper manner to ad
dress the concerns which an employer may have regarding the in
terviewing process while at the same time avoiding employer
liability.
E.

Other Language

In addition to what is typically on an application, the employer
should include notice of certain other topics on application forms to
avoid inadvertently violating various federal and state laws enacted
to protect applicants and employees. Pursuant to federal and state
statutes, it may be in an employer's best interest to include state
ments regarding the following areas of law: (i) equal employment
opportunity, acknowledging that the employer will not discriminate
on the basis of race, gender, national origin, religious beliefs, or sex
ual preference;35 (ii) immigration reform and control, acknowledg
ing that the employer will not knowingly hire illegal aliens;36 (iii)
testing requirements prior to or subsequent to employment, provid
ing applicants with notice of expected health or preference test
34. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 52B (1996).
35. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). Section 2000e-2(a) provides the following:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
Id.
36. See 8 U.S.c. § 1324(a) (1994) (prohibiting employers from knowingly hiring
an illegal alien or not complying with verification procedures).
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ing;37 (iv) at-will employment declaration, stating that employees
can be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason at
all;38 (v) statement requiring certification that the information pro
vided by the applicant is true and complete, and providing notice to
employees that the employer will rely on the information provided
and that falsification thereof is cause for dismissal;39 and (vi) a
waiver and authorization to verify information, speak to references,
and conduct criminal and credit checks and giving the employer the
right to obtain information from third parties. 40
By including statements regarding the above referenced topics
on employment applications, employers ensure their compliance
with state and federal laws, thereby avoiding potential liability.
Further, the employer provides itself with an avenue to terminate
the employee if the application is incorrect.
III.

THE EMPLOYMENT INTERVIEW

Just as employers must be careful regarding the questions they
ask on employment applications, they must also exercise care dur
ing any personal interviews that they conduct. Precautions must be
taken regardless of whether the interview is the result of a help
wanted advertisement in the newspaper or an unsolicited applica
tion for employment.
Certain questions may not be asked during a personal inter
view, but impermissible inquiries can often be replaced with per
missible inquiries that reveal the information the employer wishes
to gather. An employer should not ask if an employee has a disabil
ity that would interfere with his or her ability to fulfill the job re
quirements, as such a question would violate chapter 151B, section
4(16) of the General Laws of Massachusetts. 41 However, an em
37. See Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507, 514-15 (D.
Mass. 1974). The employer must show that any exam administered is in fact "substan
tially related" to the job performance. Cf. Cox v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 414 Mass.
375,380,386,607 N.E.2d 1035, 1038, 1042 (1993) (holding that the test used was related
to job performance, and thus that it was proper to be required for the job).
38. See Jackson v. Action for Boston Community Dev. Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 9, 525
N.E.2d 411, 412 (1988).
39. See generally Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th
Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513
U.S. 352 (1995).
40. See MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, INC., DOCUMENTING
THE HIRING PROCESS 7 (1996).
41. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(16) (1996). Section 4(16) provides the
following:
An employer may not make a preemployment inquiry of an applicant as to
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ployer is not prohibited, either by statute or case law, from asking
whether an applicant can perform the functions of the job with or
without reasonable accommodation. 42
In addition, an employer should not ask how many days the
applicant was sick last year or whether the employee ever filed a
worker's compensation claim; such a question would violate chap
ter 152, section 75B(2) of the General Laws of Massachusetts. 43
However, an employer is not prohibited by statute or case law from
asking whether an employee can meet the attendance requirements
of the job. 44
Further, an employer should not ask an applicant if he or she
has ever been treated for an alcohol or mental health problem, or
inquire as to what drugs the applicant is currently taking. Ques
tions phrased in this manner may potentially violate chapter 151B,
section 4(9A) of the General Laws of Massachusetts. 45 However,
an employer may ask an applicant about illegal drug or alcohol use
so long as the question asked is not likely to elicit information
about drug addiction or alcoholism, as these are disabilities covered
by the Americans with Disabilities "Act ("ADA").46
whether the applicant is a handicapped individual or as to the nature or sever
ity of the handicap, except that an employer may condition an offer of employ
ment on the results of a medical examination conducted solely for the purpose
of determining whether the employee, with reasonable accommodation, is ca
pable of performing the essential functions of the job, and an employer may
invite applicants to voluntarily disclose their handicap for purposes of assisting
the employer in its affirmative action efforts.
Id.
42. See EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on Pre-Employment Inquiries Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 8 Lab. ReI. Rep. (BNA) (405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.)
7191, 7192 (Oct. 10, 1995) [hereinafter Enforcement Guidance]; see also ADA Assist
ance Manual, supra note 8, at 7026.
43. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 75B(2) (1996). Section 75B(2) states that
"[n]o employer or duly authorized agent of an employer shall discharge, refuse to hire
or in any other manner discriminate against an employee because the employee has
exercised a right afforded by [the worker's compensation laws]." Id.
44. See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 42, at 7192.
45. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(9A) (1996). Section 4(9A) provides the
following:
No application for employment shall contain any questions or requests for
information regarding the admission of an applicant, on one or more occa
sions, voluntarily or involuntarily, to any public or private facility for the care
and treatment of mentally iII persons, provided that such applicant has been
discharged from such public or private facility or facilities and is no longer
under treatment directly related to such admission.
Id.
46. See Enforcement Guidance, supra note 42, at 7196. Nonetheless, questions
regarding drug and alcohol use should generally be avoided due to their tendency to
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In addition to questioning applicants, a number of employers
require potential employees to undergo drug testing as part of the
interviewing process. 47 Employers may require drug tests if the
work to be performed is dangerous or if there are safety, liability,
product control, or other concerns.48 Although there are no Massa
chusetts cases addressing the issue, courts in other jurisdictions
have held that an employer is not required to inform the applicant
of test results if the applicant fails the preemployment drug screen
ing. 49 Since there is no recognized duty to inform the applicant that
he has failed a drug test, an employer's exposure to actions filed as
a result of such a disclosure should be minimapo In fact, the
illicit information about a disability. See id.; see also Buckley v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 127 F.3d 270, 272-74 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing alcoholism and drug addiction and
the circumstances under which each is a disability under the ADA).
47. See generally Webster v. Motorola, Inc., 418 Mass. 425, 637 N.E.2d 203 (1994);
Folmsbee v. Tech Tool Grinding & Supply, Inc., 417 Mass. 388, 630 N.E.2d 586 (1994);
Guiney v. Police Comm'r, 411 Mass. 328,582 N.E.2d 523 (1991); O'Connor v. Police
Comm'r, 408 Mass. 324, 557 N.E.2d 1146 (1990); Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective
Ass'n, Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n, 403 Mass. 692, 532 N.E.2d 644 (1989).
48. See Folmsbee, 417 Mass. at 393-94, 630 N.E.2d at 589-90 (holding that requir
ing employees to undergo drug testing was a legitimate business interest of the defend
ant which outweighed the plaintiff's rights to privacy when the plaintiff filed a suit
alleging that the requirement of taking a drug test to maintain employment with the
defendant violated the plaintiff's right to privacy under chapter 214, section 1(B) of the
General Laws of Massachusetts); see also Webster, 418 Mass. at 431, 637 N.E.2d at 206
07.
.
49. See Reeves v. Western Co. of N. Am., 867 S.W.2d 385, 388-91 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993), abrogated on other grounds by Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994).
In Reeves, the plaintiff was a prospective employee who failed a drug test and was not
hired on account of traces of alcohol found in his urine sample. See id. at 388. When a
second drug test was conducted on the sample, the result was again positive for alcohol.
See id. at 389. A letter from the laboratory which accompanied the results revealed that
there could be two separate sources of the alcohol, either direct alcohol consumption or
sugar which is broken into alcohol due to a health problem within the body. See id.
The plaintiff was not notified of this second test, its results, or the accompanying letter.
Thus, he was unable to explain that he had diabetic problems that most likely would
account for the alcohol in his urine. See id. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant
was negligent in the manner in which it secured, tested and/or reported the test results
of the urine sample. See id. at 390. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant inten
tionally inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiff's wife when she was told of the re
sults of the test. See id. at 391. Because the court found that the employer did not owe
a duty to the prospective employee, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was af
firmed. See id. at 391, 397.
50. See Doe v. Roe, Inc., 553 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (showing
that disclosure of drug test results, however, may expose an employer to liability). In
Doe, the employer made itself vulnerable to legal action by disclosing the results of a
preemployment drug screening test to the plaintiff. See id. Bringing an action under
the New York State Human Rights Laws, the plaintiff claimed that the metabolites
found in his urine sample resulted from his consumption of bread which contained
poppy seeds and not from unlawful opiate use. See id. The plaintiff alleged that the
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Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Depart
ment, declared that only when the prospective employer is "chal
lenged" must it come forward with evidence establishing that its
testing method accurately tested that which it was designed to
test. 51 Further, the New York court cautioned as follows:
While employers have broad discretion in setting hiring stan
dards and administering tests to ensure that prospective employ
ees meet those standards, the employer must show "that the
standard or test bears a rational relationship to and is a valid
predictor of employee job performance, and that it does not cre
ate an arbitrary, artificial and unnecessary barrier to employment
which operates invidiously to discriminate on the basis of an im
permissible classification. "52

An employer's right to conduct drug or alcohol screening is
based largely upon the employer's legitimate business interest so
long as such tests are not used to achieve unlawful ends.
Once the interview stage is completed, and the prospective em
ployee has fulfilled the preemployment requirements, the employer
should then contemplate reducing its exposure to liability during
the employment relationship itself. An employer can reduce its lia
bility through several methods, which are discussed in the following
sections.
IV.

A.

BEYOND THE INTERVIEW

Posting Requirements

Once an employer has hired employees, the employer must
comply with various posting requirements. Notice of the following
topics, which are available from appropriate federal and state agen
cies, must be posted in a conspicuous place where employees can
readily see them: (i) equal employment opportunity;53 (ii) job safety
and health protections;54 (iii) fair labor standards;55 (iv) employee
prospective employer did not use a testing method which would definitively distinguish
the metabolites resulting from opiate use. See id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Sontag v. Bronstein, 303 N.E.2d 405, 407 (N.Y. 1973».
53. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.30 (1998) ("Every employer, employment agency, labor
organization, and joint labor-management committee controlling an apprenticeship or
other training program that has an obligation under Title VII or the ADA shall post
and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its premises notices in an accessible format
... describing the applicable provisions of Title VII and the ADA.").
54. See 29 U.S.c. § 657(c)(1) (1994) (noting that the Secretary will "issue regula
tions requiring that employers, through posting of notices or other means, keep their
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polygraph protection;56 and family and medical leave rights. 57
Beyond merely complying with these posting requirements,
employers can limit their potential liability through the use of writ
ten agreements that delineate the employment relationship.
B.

Employment Agreements that Protect Employers
1.

Non-Competition Agreements

Employment agreements often provide significant opportuni
ties for employers to protect business assets, including good will,
trade secrets, and intellectual property. 58 If an employer fails to
draft an employment agreement, an employee can "plan to go into
competition with his employer and may take active steps to do so
while still employed."59 Regardless of the existence of an employemployees informed of their protections and obligations under this chapter, including
the provisions of applicable standards"); see also 29 c.P.R. § 1903.2(a)(1) (1998)
("Each employer shall post and keep posted a notice or notices, to be furnished by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, informing
employees of the protections and obligations provided for in the [Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U.s.c. §§ 651-678,] and that for assistance information ... employ
ees should contact the employer or the nearest Office of the Department of Labor.
Such notices shall be posted by the employer in each establishment in conspicuous
place or places where notices to employees are customarily posted.").
55. See 29 c.P.R. § 516.4 (1998) ("Every employer employing any employee sub
ject to the ... minimum wage provisions [of the Pair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.c.
§§ 201-219,] shall post and keep posted a notice explaining the Act ... in conspicuous
places in every establishment where such employees are employed so as to permit them
to observe readily a copy.").
56. See id. § 801.6 ("Every employer subject to [the Employee Polygraph Protec
tion Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 2001-2009,] shall post and keep posted on its premises a notice
explaining the Act, as prescribed by the Secretary. Such notice must be posted in a
prominent and conspicuous place in every establishment of the employer where it can
readily be observed by employees and applicants for employment."); see also 29 U.S.c.
§ 2003 ("Each employer shall post and maintain such notice in a conspicuous place on
its premises where notices to employees and applicants to employment are customarily
posted."); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 19B (1996).
57. See 29 c.P.R. § 825.300 (1998) ("Every employer covered by the [Family and
Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 2601-2654,] is required to post on its premises, in con
spicuous places where employees are employed, whether or not it has any 'eligible'
employees, a notice explaining the Act's provisions and providing information concern
ing the procedures for filing complaints of violations of the Act with the Wage and
Hour Division. The notice must be posted prominently where it can be readily seen by
employees and applicants for employment."); see also 29 U.S.c. § 2619 (1994); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105D (1996).
58. See Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 409 Mass. 165, 172-73,565 N.E.2d 415, 419-20
(1991).
59. Id. at 172, 565 N.E.2d at 419. In Augat, the defendant was a former employee
and future competitor of the plaintiff corporation. See id. at 166, 565 N.E.2d at 416.
While in the plaintiffs employ, the individual defendant signed an agreement not to
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ment agreement, however, an employee may not appropriate his
employer's trade secrets. He may not solicit his employer's custom
ers while still working for his employer, and he may not carry away
certain information, such as lists of customers. In addition, such a
person may not act for his future interests at the expense of his
employer by using the employer's funds or employees for personal
gain or by a course of conduct designed to hurt the employer.60
Nonetheless, a restrictive covenant may be used to expand upon the
protections afforded to an employer. It should be noted, however,
that where a restrictive covenant not to compete interferes with the
former employee's right to earn a living, the covenant will not be
enforceable. 61
In Massachusetts, non-competition agreements are generally
enforced if they are deemed necessary to protect legitimate busi
ness interests, and if the language of the covenant "is reasonably
limited in time and space, and is consonant with the public inter
est."62 If a court finds that a non-competition covenant is overcompete. One month after that agreement expired, he made plans to form the defend
ant corporation while he and a current employee of the plaintiff corporation took ac
tions to recruit key managers of the plaintiff corporation. See id. The court decided
that while it is permissible to plan and take active steps to go into competition with an
employer, "before he terminates his employment, a top managerial employee may not
solicit the departure of employees to work for a competitor." Id. at 173, 565 N.E.2d at
420.
60. See id. at 172-73, 565 N.E.2d at 419-20.
61. See Richmond Bros., Inc. v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 357 Mass. 106, 109-11,
256 N.E.2d 304, 306-08 (1970). In Richmond Brothers, the plaintiff, a broadcast com
pany sued its former employee, a radio talk show personality, alleging that the defend
ant breached his covenant not to compete by working for a competing radio station.
The court stated the following:
In determining whether a restriction as to time is reasonable, we must consider
the nature of the plaintiffs business and the character of the employment in
volved, as well as the situation of the parties, the necessity of the restriction for
the protection of the employer's business and the right of the employee to
work and earn a livelihood.
Id. at 110, 256 N.E.2d at 307. The court further noted the following:
"[A]n employer cannot by contract prevent his employee from using the skill
and intelligence acquired or increased and improved through experience or
through instruction received in the course of the employment. The employee
may achieve superiority in his particular department by every lawful means at
hand, and then, upon the rightful termination of his contract for service, use
that superiority for the benefit of rivals in trade of his former employer."
Id. at 111, 256 N.E.2d at 307 (quoting Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 263 Mass. 223,
226-27, 160 N.E.2d 804, 806 (1928».
62. Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 342 Mass. 714, 716, 175 N.E.2d 374, 376
(1961); see also Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 647, 358 N.E.2d
804, 807 (1976). In Analogic, the plaintiff corporation employed two of the individual
defendants during the development of an unpatented, high speed data acquisition mod
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broad, the court may limit enforcement to a more appropriate time
and space. 63 Note however, in Massachusetts, non-competition
agreements between physicians are unenforceable. 64
Furthermore, it is firmly established in Massachusetts law that
when a court is determining "whether a covenant will be enforced,
in whole or in part, the reasonable needs of the former employer
for protection against harmful conduct of the former employee
must be weighed against both.the reasonableness of the restraint
imposed on the former employee and the public interest. "65 When
ule. See id. at 645, 358 N.E.2d at 805. Development took some eighteen months and
over $100,000 in funds. See id., 358 N.E.2d at 806. Once the module was developed,
the two individual defendants were released from their duties at Analogic. At the time
of their departure, the two individuals signed statements indicating that they would not
take with them any documents or any materials belonging to Analogic. See id., 358
N.E.2d at 806. Shortly thereafter, the two individuals, and others, formed the defend
ant corporation for the purpose of creating a data acquisition module similar in all
respects to that of plaintiff's Module "MP 6912." The defendants used documents,
drawings, and a sample of the plaintiff's module to create, in just a few months and at a
cost of approximately $2,500, a copy of the MP 6912. See id., 358 N.E.2d at 806. The
court determined that an injunction could be issued against the defendants and that the
time period for which it would be effective would be based upon the reasonableness of
its scope, i.e., the length of time it would normally take for skilled engineers to dupli
cate the product once it has been offered to the general public. See id. at 647, 358
N.E.2d at 808.
63. See All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 364 Mass. 773,777-78,308 N.E.2d 481, 485
(1974) (enforcing a two-year non-competition agreement, but reducing the geographic
area to prior sales territory).
64. Chapter 112, section 12X of the General Laws of Massachusetts provides the
following:
Any contract or agreement which creates or establishes the terms of a partner
ship, employment, or any other form of professional relationship with a physi
cian registered to practice medicine pursuant to section two, which includes
any restriction of the right of such physician to practice medicine in any geo
graphic area for any period of time after the termination of such partnership,
employment or professional relationship shall be void and unenforceable with
respect to said restriction; provided, however, that nothing herein shall render
void or unenforceable the remaining provisions of any such contract or
agreement.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12X (1996); see also Falmouth Ob-Gyn Assocs. v. Abisla,
417 Mass. 176, 179-80,629 N.E.2d 291, 293 (1994) (interpreting statute as unenforceable
due to its compensation for competition clause as a restriction on employment).
65. All Stainless, 364 Mass. at 778, 308 N.E.2d at 485; accord Richmond Bros., 357
Mass. at 110, 256 N.E.2d at 307; Cedric G. Chase Photo. Lab., Inc. v. Hennessey, 327
Mass. 137, 139, 97 N.E.2d 397, 398-99 (1951); Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. Mc
Menamy, 290 Mass. 549, 553, 195 N.E. 747, 748 (1935); Walker Coal & Ice Co. v. West
erman, 263 Mass. 235, 238, 160 N.E. 801, 802 (1928); see also RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRAcrs §§ 515-516 (1932); 6A ARlHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1394 (1962); Annotation, Enforceability of Restrictive Covenant, Ancillary to Employ
ment Contract, as Affected by Territorial Extent of Restriction, 43 A.L.R.2d 94, 116
(1955).
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the covenant is too encompassing in time, in area, or in any other
respect, only those portions that can be severed and are reasonable
will be enforced. 66 Finally, an employer cannot use an employment
contract to restrain "ordinary competition," which occurs when an
employee is rightfully terminated and takes the expertise of the
trade acquired while working for the former employer and applies
these skills for the benefit of a new employer, often a rival in the
trade of the former employer.67
When an employer terminates employment in contravention of
the employment contract, any restrictive covenants included in the
contract cannot be enforced. 68 The issue of whether restrictive cov
enants included in a wrongfully terminated employment contract
may be enforced was raised in Ward v. American Mutual Liability
Insurance CO. 69 In Ward, the plaintiffs signed a written employ
ment contract which provided that termination could only occur on
the anniversary of employment. 7o When the defendant required
employees to sign a new contract after ten years of service or be
terminated, the plaintiffs refused to sign and were subsequently ter
minated.71 The terminated employees filed suit against American
Mutual for breach of the employment contract. 72 In response,
American Mutual asserted that the plaintiffs violated the non-com
petition clause of the contract, which provided "that the employee,
for a period of eighteen months following termination of employ
ment, would not procure, solicit, accept or refer applications or in
quiries about insurance from persons insured by the defendant ...
under a policy sold or serviced by the employee. "73 The court held
for the plaintiffs because, applying contract principles, the breach
terminated the non-competition obligations of the contract. 74
Thus, an employer may protect its interests through the use of
a restrictive covenant, so long as that employer does not terminate
the employee in contravention of the employment contract. Simi
66. See All Stainless, 364 Mass. at 778, 308 N.E.2d at 485.
67. See Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 263 Mass. 223, 226-27, 160 N.E. 804, 806
(1928) ("[A]n employer cannot by contract prevent his employee from using the skill
and intelligence acquired or increased and improved through experience or through
instruction received in the course of the employment.").
68. See Ward v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 98, 101, 443
N.E.2d 1342, 1344 (1983).
69. 15 Mass. App. Ct. 98, 443 N.E.2d 1342 (1983).
70. See id. at 99, 443 N.E.2d at 1343.
71. See id., 443 N.E.2d at 1342-43.
72. See id. at 98, 443 N.E.2d at 1342.
73. Id. at 99, 443 N.E.2d at 1342.
74. See id. at 101, 443 N.E.2d at 1344.
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larly, although not necessarily required, an employer may protect
its interests in trade secrets through the use of an express
agreement.
2. Protecting Trade Secrets
A trade secret is defined as "any information that can be used
in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is suffi
ciently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic
advantage over others."75 In Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton,76
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted the six factor
test set forth in the Restatement of Torts for defining the term trade
secret. 77 Therefore, when determining whether a piece of informa
tion qualifies as a trade secret, a c,ourt in Massachusetts must con
sider the following factors:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the
business, (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and
others involved in the business, (3) the extent of measures taken
by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information, (4) the
value of the information to the employer and to his competitors,
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the employer in
developing the information, and (6) the ease or difficulty with
which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated
by others.78
If a piece of information is found to be a trade secret, it may

not be disclosed by the employee, even in the absence of an express
Nevertheless, in order to protect its trade secrets and

.~greement.79

75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). There has
been an effort made to use a uniform trade secret law. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). The uniform act defines a trade secret as
information, including formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process that: (i) derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are rea
sonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). However, this
Act has not been adopted in Massachusetts.
76. 361 Mass. 835, 282 N.E.2d 921 (1972).
77. See id. at 840, 282 N.E.2d at 925.
78. Id. at 840, 282 N.E.2d at 925.
79. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 42 (1996). Section 42 reads as follows:
Whoever embezzles, steals or unlawfully takes, carries away, conceals, or cop
ies, or by fraud or by deception obtains, from any person or corporation, with
intent to convert to his own use, any trade secret, regardless of value, shall be
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other confidential information, the employer's best course of action
is to define an· employee's obligation to maintain confidences and
secrets of the employer through the use of a written agreement. 80
3.

Protecting Patents and Copyrights

Similarly, the "shop right" doctrine allows employers to use
patents and copyrights that were developed by employees while us
ing the employer's resources. 81 However, if the employer desires
absolute ownership in the patent(s), an express agreement to that
effect must be signed by the employee-inventor. 82 Otherwise, the
employer is merely accorded a non-exclusive right to practice the
invention once a patent is obtained by the employee, and the em
ployer is not entitled to a conveyance of the invention. 83 Histori
cally, "such agreements have been construed somewhat strictly
against the employer;"84 therefore, an employer must use caution
when drafting this type of agreement. Once again, the conservative
approach, as part of an employment agreement, is to include spe
cific terms making the employer the owner of patents and copy
rights created in the course of employment and thereby preventing
disagreement and litigation in the future. Unfortunately, even if
employers follow the suggestions put forth in this Article, problems
may still arise within the employment relationship. In the event of
disagreements between the employer and the employee, an arbitra
liable in tort to such person or corporation for all damages resulting
therefrom.
Id.; see also Eastern Marble Prods. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 372 Mass. 835, 841:
364 N.E.2d 799,803 (1977) ("It is settled by our cases that the duty of an employee not
to disclose confidential information is grounded on 'basic principles of equity' ... and
upon an implied contract, growing out of the nature of the employer-employee
relation.").
80. See Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 409 Mass. 165, 172,565 N.E.2d 415, 419 (1991)
("If an employer wishes to restrict the post-employment competitive activities of a key
employee, it may seek that goal through a non-competition agreement.").
81. The "shop right" rule is defined as follows: "In patent law, the right of an
employer to use employee's invention in employer's business without payment of roy
alty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 961 (6th ed~ 1990).
82. See Dalzell v. Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 315, 320 (1893); see also
American Circular Loom Co. v. Wilson, 198 Mass. 182, 202, 84 N.E. 133, 135 (1908).
83. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 189 (1933); see
also American Circular, 198 Mass. at 202,84 N.E. at 135.
84. American Circular, 198 Mass. at 202, 84 N.E. at 136; see also Hildreth v. Duff,
143 F. 139, 140 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1906) ("The terms of [such a contract] should be so
precise as that neither party could reasonably misunderstand them." (quoting Colson v.
Thompson, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 336,341 (1817».
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tion clause that was initially set forth in the employment agreement
would serve to protect the employer's interests.
4.

Arbitration

An important section of an employment agreement, for pur
poses of protecting the employer, is a clause requiring that all em
ployment-related disputes be arbitrated. The Federal Arbitration
Act, enacted in 1925, then reenacted and codified in 1947 as Title 9
of the United States Code, governs the arbitration process and pro
cedures. 85 "Its purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English com
mon law and had been adopted by American courts and to place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts."86
Further, 9 U.S.c. § 3 grants stays of proceedings in federal district
courts when an issue in the proceeding should be arbitrated. 87 Sec
tion 4 of Title 9 provides "for orders compelling arbitration when
one party has failed, neglected, or refused to comply with an arbi
tration agreement."88 "These provisions manifest a 'liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements."'89
In Massachusetts, it is preferable for employers to resolve
claims through arbitration, especially in the context of discrimina
tion claims, which allow employees to seek unlimited damages
before a jury.90 Fortunately for employers, the trend in Massachu
setts is to favor enforceability of arbitration agreements. In
Mugnano-Bornstein v. Crowell,91 the plaintiff signed an arbitration
agreement as part of her employment contract. 92 She was later ter
minated for insubordination and subsequently filed a complaint in
superior court alleging sexual harassment and gender discrimina
tion. 93 The defendants filed a motion to stay court proceedings and
to compel enforcement of the arbitration agreement, which the
85. Act of July 30,1947, ch.392, § 1,61 Stat. 669 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.c.
§§ 1-307 (1994»; see also Massachusetts Arbitration Act, MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 251,
§§ 1-19 (1996).
86. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); see also
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20, 220 n.6 (1985); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 & n.4 (1974).
87. See 9 U.S.c. § 3; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25.
88. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25; see also 9 U.S.c. § 4.
89. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hasp. v. Mercury Con
str. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983».
90. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 5 (1996).
91. 42 Mass. App. Ct. 347, 677 N.E.2d 242 (1997).
92. See id. at 348,677 N.E.2d at 244.
93. See id., 677 N.E.2d at 244.
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court granted. 94 At the arbitration hearing, the plaintiff's claims
were unanimously denied and dismissed. 95 The plaintiff petitioned
the court to revoke the stay and in response the defendants re
quested enforcement of the arbitration findings. 96 The superior
court, citing a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, reversed the stay and found that the plaintiff
did not knowingly waive her rights to a jury tria1. 97 However, on
appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the ar
bitration agreement was binding and that the plaintiff had waived
all claims, including discrimination claims. 98 The Supreme Judicial
Court refused to adopt the "knowing waiver" requirement of the
Ninth Circuit, thus recognizing the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. 99
Language that compels employees to arbitrate all employment
disputes has become more popular in recent years. The leading
case in this area is Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corpora
tion.1°O In Gilmer, the defendant hired the plaintiff as a "Manager
of Financial Services" in May of 1981. 101 The plaintiff was required,
as a condition of his employment, to register as a securities repre
sentative with several stock exchanges, including the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE").102 In 1987, at the age of 62, the plain
tiff was released from his job. He claimed the release was age re
lated.1 03 When the plaintiff initiated proceedings against his former
employer in the United States District Court for the Western Divi
sion of North Carolina, under the Age Discrimination in Employ
94.

See id., 677 N.E.2d at 244.
See id. at 349, 677 N.E.2d at 244.
See id., 677 N.E.2d at 244.
See id., 677 N.E.2d at 244 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d
1299 (9th Cir. 1994». Although Prudential Insurance was
decided after the original order compelling arbitration, the judge ruled that
"an employee must knowingly agree to arbitrate discrimination claims under
G.L. c. 151B in order to waive her right to trial," and that the plaintiff "could
not have known that she was waiving her statutory right to a trial on her sex
ual harassment and discrimination claims" when she signed the application for
employment containing the arbitration agreement.
Id., 677 N.E.2d at 244 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir.
1994».
98. See id. at 353, 677 N.E.2d at 247.
99. See id. at 352, 677 N.E.2d at 246.
100. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
101. Id. at 23.
102. See id.
103. See id.
95.
96.
97.
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ment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"),104 the defendant filed a motion to
compel arbitration based on a provision of the application com
pleted for the NYSE.1°5 The relevant application provision re
quired arbitration of "[a]ny controversy between a registered
representative and any member or member organization arising out
of the employment or termination of employment of such regis
tered representative."l06
The majority opinion in Gilmer recognized that there may be
an inequality in bargaining power when parties enter into an em
ployment contract. 107 The Court decided, however, that this ine
quality is "not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context. "108
Thus, an employer can ensure the enforceability of an arbitration
provision by confirming that the clause providing for arbitration
reaches all the areas intended to be subject to arbitration. 109
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a dissenting
opinion in the Gilmer case. 110 In his dissent, Justice Stevens de
clared that the Court's majority opinion barely touched upon the
antecedent issue of "whether the coverage of the Act even extends
to arbitration clauses contained in employment contracts, regard
less of the subject matter of the claim at issue."l11 Justice Stevens
detailed portions of the history of the Federal Arbitration Act and
also quoted the chairman of the American Bar Association commit
tee that was responsible for drafting the bill. 112 The chairman had
assured the Senators by stating that the bill "is not intended [to] be
an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give
the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agree
ing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do
104. 29 U.S.c. §§ 621-634 (1994).
105. See Gilmer, 500 u.s. at 24.
106. Id. at 23.
107. See id. at 33.
108. Id.
109. See Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Central Life Assur. Co., 85 F.3d 21, 28 (2d
Cir. 1996) (providing that the strong federal policy favoring arbitration will only extend
its reach into scopes of arbitration which are written into individual agreements). In
addition, some jurisdictions may require arbitration, even where the agreement does
not specifically call for it. See Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins. Co.,
867 F.2d 809, 812 (4th Cir. 1989) ("Indeed, the heavy presumption of arbitrability re
quires that when the scope of the arbitration clause is open to question, a court must
decide the question in favor of arbitration.").
110. Gilmer, 500 u.S. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. See id. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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it."113 While it is true that merchants have the right and privilege of
sitting down and bargaining on equal footing, there is a definite ine
quality of bargaining power between an employer and a potential
employee. The employer lays down the offer and the terms of the
employment agreement; the potential employee has no choice but
to accept the terms of the agreement or surrender the opportunity
to work. Therefore, employment contracts are not entered into on
equal bargaining terms, and the employee may be forced to give up
his or her right to have the case litigated by a court. 1l4 Nonetheless,
the majority view of the Supreme Court is that the unequal bargain
ing positions of those entering into employment contracts does not
render arbitration agreements per se unenforceable. 1lS
V.

EMPLOYMENT MANUALS AND POLICIES AND THEIR EFFECT
ON THE GENERAL RULE OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT

Absent contractual terms to the contrary, the general rule in
Massachusetts is that employees are presumed to be employed at
will, and thus that the employment relationship can be terminated
by either party at any time. 1l6 As a result, in any written statements
regarding the employment relationship, there should be no refer
ences to "permanent employees" or any other use of the word "per
manent." The word "permanent" should be replaced with the word
"regular" in an attempt to avoid the inference of employment for
life. 1l7
When dealing with an at-will employment relationship, it is not
generally necessary that an employer have "good cause" to dis
113. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before
the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Congo 9 (1923».
114. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 33.
116. See Jackson V. Boston Community Dev., Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 9, 525 N.E.2d 411,
412 (1988) ("As a general rule, where an employment contract ... contains no definite
period of employment, it establishes employment at will."); see also Upton V. Busi
ness Iand, 425 Mass. 756, 757, 682 N.E.2d 1357, 1358 (1997) ("The general rule is that an
at-will employee may be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason at
all. ").

117. In addition, employers should avoid references to fixed periods of time, such
as annual salaries or specific examples of times for discipline or suspension because
these may impose additional burdens on the employer. Similarly, references to a "pro
bationary period" should be changed to "nonregular" with respect to reasons for disci
pline or termination because at the end of a "probationary period," an employee could
reasonably argue that they should be considered "permanent" and entitled to lifetime
employment.
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charge an employee. 118 Only when the discharge of an at-will em
ployee is against public policy does a claim for breach of a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing arise.1 19 The following are examples
of discharges of an employee that were found to be against public
policy. In Montalvo v. Zamora,120 an employer discharged an em
ployee because the employee hired an attorney to negotiate his
claim that the employer violated the minimum wage law. 121 In
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehouseman & Helpers, Local 396,122 an employee was dis
charged for refusing to commit perjury before a government com
mission. 123 In Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 124 the plaintiff
was discharged for filing a worker's compensation claim.125 Aside
from at-will terminations that are against public policy, like those
mentioned above, it appears that in at-will employment relation
ships involving commissions, employers can only terminate employ
ees entitled to commissions for good faith reasons.1 26
In determining whether an employment contract is for a spe
cific duration such that the inference of "at-will" employment is re
118. See Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300,303,431 N.E.2d 908, 910 (1982)
(citing Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981».
119. See id., 431 N.E.2d at 910.
120. 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
121. See id. at 402.
122. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
123. See id. at 27-28.
124. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
125. See id. at 426.
126. See RLM Assocs., Inc. v. Carter Mfg. Corp., 356 Mass. 718, 248 N.E.2d 646
(1969); see also Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977). In RLM Associates, Carter, the employer, fired its representative, RLM, shortly
before Carter was awarded a contract which was discovered and brought to its attention
by RLM. See RLM Assocs., 356 Mass. at 718, 248 N.E.2d at 646. The awarding of the
contract would have required Carter to pay a commission to RLM. See id., 248 N.E.2d
at 646.
In Fortune, a cash register salesman was discharged by his employer shortly after
he completed a sale worth $5,000,000, of which he was to receive a contractual bonus of
$92,079. See Fortune, 373 Mass. at 98-99, 364 N.E.2d at 1254. Fortune only received
75% of the bonus due on the sale and the remaining 25% of the bonus was paid to a
systems and installations person, contrary to the company's usual policy of paying only
the salesperson a bonus. See id. at 99, 364 N.E.2d at 1254. The court decided that
"where the principal seeks to deprive the agent of all compensation by terminating the
contractual relationship when the agent is on the brink of successfully completing the
sale, the principal has acted in bad faith and the ensuing transaction between the princi
pal and the buyer is to be regarded as having been accomplished by the agent." Id. at
104-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. The court then added that "the same result obtains where
the principal attempts to deprive the agent of any portion of a commission due the
agent." Id., 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
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butted, courts will evaluate the actual language of the contract and
various other employment related documents as well as the circum
stances that existed between the parties when said documents were
executed.
A.

Determining Whether a Contract Is for a Specific Term

In Frederick v. Conagra, Inc. ,127 the court found that whether
certain documents amounted to a contract of employment for a spe
cific term was an issue of fact that must be resolved at trial.1 28 In
Frederick, the United States District Court for the District of Mas
sachusetts held that a letter confirming an annual salary and indi
cating that the employer agreed to cancel a loan after two years of
employment was sufficient for the jury to find that a two-year em
ployment contract existed. 129
In a similar case, Kravetz v. Merchants Distributors, Inc. ,130 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a motion for a di
rected verdict was improper because the jury could have found that
a contract was for a specific term and was not terminable at-will.131
The court stated that "'[w]hether there is a contract for services for
a definite period of time ... depends upon all the attendant condi
tions surrounding the agreement, as well as upon its terms, when
the latter are not specific and clear."'132 When an employment con
tract is unclear in terms of the duration of employment "it [is]
proper for the jury to refer not only to the contract language but
also to the attendant circumstances, including 'the nature of the em
ployment, ... the prior negotiation[s], [and] the situation of the
127. 713 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass 1989).
128. See id. at 46. In Frederick, the employer offered a position to the plaintiff
with an oral representation that Frederick was being hired for at least two years. See id.
at 43. An employment contract was never signed, and less than three months after the
plaintiff began working for the defendant, after the plaintiff had relocated his family
from Buffalo, New York to Massachusetts, he was fired on thirty days notice for no
stated cause. See id. The plaintiff brought a claim for breach of employment contract
based not on a written employment agreement but on various representations and ne
gotiations between the parties which induced Frederick to leave his former job and join
the employer's company. See id. at 44-45. Such representations and negotiations were
found by the court to be questions of material fact, which were genuinely in dispute
when determining whether an agreement for employment for a specific term had ex
isted. See id. at 46.
129. See id.
130. 387 Mass. 457, 440 N.E.2d 1278 (1982).
131. See id. at 460, 440 N.E.2d at 1280.
132. [d., 440 N.E.2d at 1280 (alteration in original) (quoting Maynard v. Royal
Worcester Corset Co., 200 Mass. 1,4, 85 N.E. 877, 878 (1908)).
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parties.' "133

B.

Determining Whether Handbooks Create an Express or
Implied Contract

Employers must use caution in drafting employee handbooks,
as certain language may alter the presumption of at-will employ
ment. In determining whether an employee handbook constitutes
an employment contract, Massachusetts courts have looked at the
following factors which are collectively known as the Jackson test:
(i) whether the employer retained the right to unilaterally change
the employment manual; (ii) whether the employee ever negotiated
any of the terms; (iii) whether a specific term of employment was
stated in the manual; (iv) whether the employee signed the manual
or manifested his assent to it or acknowledged that he understood
its terms; (v) whether any special attention was given the manual by
the employer; and (vi) whether the manual was merely intended to
provide guidance or actual obligations. 134
Recent Massachusetts cases have relied on the Jackson test
when determining whether a handbook created contractual terms.
For example, in Biggins v. Hazen Paper CO.,135 the court held that
the absence of two elements of the Jackson test was fatal for the
plaintiff.136 The plaintiff argued that the employment handbook
created an express contract, and in the alternative, an implied con
tract.137 The plaintiff had been terminated and wanted to receive
payment for his accrued vacation time which he was entitled to pur
suant to a provision in the employee handbook.138 The court held
that since the plaintiff had no opportunity to negotiate the terms of
the handbook and no special attention was given to the handbook
133. Id., 440 N.E.2d at 1280 (alterations in original) (quoting Mahoney v. Hil
dreth & Rogers Co., 332 Mass. 496, 498, 125 N.E.2d 788, 790 (1955».
134. See Jackson v. Action for Boston Community Dev., Inc., 403 Mass. 8, 525
N.E.2d 411 (1988). In Jackson, the employee contended that he entered into an em
ployment contract with his employer based on terms which were established by a "Per
sonnel Policies Manual" distributed by the employer. Id. at 8, 525 N.E.2d at 412. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached this employment contract by discharging
him in a manner which did not comport with the grievance procedure outlined in the
personnel manual. The court considered several factors in reaching a decision that the
conduct and relation of the parties "fell short of that which would allow a jury to decide
reasonably that the parties had entered an implied contract based on the manual's
terms." Id. at 15,525 N.E.2d at 416.
135. 953 F.2d 1405 (1st Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
136. See id. at 1423-24.
137. See id. at 1422.
138. See id.
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by the employer, there was neither an express nor an implied con
tract, and therefore, no breach existed.B9 Likewise, in Mullen v.
Ludlow Hospital,140 the court held that an employment manual did
not create an employment contract and that the plaintiff was, ac
cordingly, an at-will employee. 141 The court reasoned as follows:
There was no agreement, written or oral, specifying a definite
period of employment. While there was an employment manual,
it did riot form the basis of a contract because the plaintiff did not
negotiate its terms and received it only after he began working.
In addition, the manual, by its own terms, declared [that] it was
not a contract and that the Hospital could change the terms
unilaterally.142
The cases on this point seem to favor the employer in that a plaintiff
arguing that an employment manual forms the basis of a contract
will be required to meet all factors of the Jackson test in order to
prevail.

C.

The Effect of Disclaimers in Employment Manuals

Finally, in order to strengthen an employer's argument that a
handbook does not form the basis of a contract, the employment
handbook should contain a strong contract disclaimer.1 43 Disclaim
ers run the gamut from simple one sentence references that the
handbook is not a contract and that all employment is at-will to the
much more detailed. The following is an example of a detailed
disclaimer:
The policies stated in this Handbook are intended as guide
lines only and are subject to change at the sole discretion of the
Company. This Handbook should not be construed as and does
not constitute a contract guaranteeing employment for any spe
cific duration. Although we hope that your employment rela
tionship with us is long-term, either you or the Company may
terminate this relationship at any time, for any reason, with or
without cause or notice. Please understand that no supervisor,
manager, or representative of XYZ other than the [e.g., Presi
dent], has the authority to enter into any agreement with you for
139. See id. at 1423.
140. 32 Mass. App. Ct. 968, 592 N.E.2d 1342 (1992).
141. See id. at 969, 592 N.E.2d at 1344.
142. Id., 592 N.E.2d at 1344 (citation omitted).
143. See id., 592 N.E.2d at 1344 (noting that a disclaimer within the employment
manual, which provided that the manual was not a contract, was a factor in the courts
determination of at-will employment).
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employment for any specified period of time or to make any
promises or commitments contrary to the foregoing. Further,
any employment agreement entered into by the [e.g., President]
shall not be enforceable unless it is in writing.144

When an employer uses a detailed disclaimer, including lan
guage equivalent to that quoted above, little room is left for the
employee to argue that the employment relationship is anything
other than at-will. Thus, the employer's risk that a court will rule
that an employment contract existed and attribute to the employer
additional, unforeseen obligations in the employment relationship
is thereby reduced. For example, in Seeley v. Prime Computer,
Inc. ,145 when the plaintiff argued that the employment manual cre
ated a contract, the Massachusetts Appeals Court disagreed and
held that the employment manual in question did not create a con
tract due to an express disclaimer contained therein. 146
In Seeley, the plaintiff took a leave of absence due to a mental
disability and received payments from the defendant. 147 After sev
eral months, the defendant required the plamtiff to undergo an
other psychological examination to determine if she could return to
work.148 The defendant felt that the plaintiff was able to come back
to work, but the plaintiff refused to take the same job she had prior
to her leave of absence. 149 The defendant subsequently terminated
her employment. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract relying
on the employment manual's clause "which included, in its terms
and conditions, both short and long term disability benefits. "150
The court reasoned that the employment manual did not constitute
a contract:
The Employee Handbook upon which Mrs. Seeley relies contains
a disclaimer on page one which clearly states that the Handbook
cannot be construed as a contract between Prime and its employ
ees; that the policies and procedures set forth do not constitute
conditions of employment; and that Prime reserved the right uni
laterally to "modify, revoke, suspend, terminate or change any or
all such plans, policies or procedures in whole or in part at any
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

ROBERT J. NOBILE, GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE
1990 Mass. App. Div. 132 (1990).
See id. at 134.
See id. at 132.
See id. at 133.
See id.
Id.

HANDBOOKS

§ 3.06[2] (1992 ed.).
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time without notice."151
Although most employment manuals contain disclaimer lan
guage providing that the manual does not constitute a contract,
problems still arise when the employment manual requires the em
ployer to follow established guidelines in order to discipline or ter
minate employees. i52 "[I]n certain limited situations, an employer's
discharge of an at-will employee may give rise to a cause of action
for wrongful discharge such as where the at-will status of the em
ployee is altered by the terms of an employee handbook ...."153
When the employer is found to be liable for breach of an at-will
employment contract based on violations of an employee hand
book, the employee is entitled to back pay and reinstatement to his
or her former employment position. 154
D.

The Effect of Severance and Reemployment Right Clauses in
Employment Manuals

An employer may encounter problems if it chooses to describe
severance and reemployment rights in its employment manua1. 155
151. Id. at 134.
152. See generally Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 388 S.E.2d 808 (S.c. 1990). Small
was employed as a spinner by Springs for a period of eight years. See id. at 810. During
Small's employment, Springs utilized an employee handbook which set out a four step
procedure for discharging employees. See id. Small was not discharged in accordance
with the handbook's four step procedure and filed her action for breach of contract,
claiming that her at-will employment status was altered by the provisions of the em
ployee handbook. See id.
153. [d. (citing Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 357 S.E.2d 452 (S.c. 1987».
154. See id. at 814 (Littlejohn, J., concurring and dissenting).
155. See generally Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 356 A.2d 221 (Md. 1976). Brunswick
had both written and unwritten policies and practices which were followed regarding
severance and vacation pay. See id. at 223. An unwritten practice which Brunswick
followed regarding entitlement to severance pay was that two weeks' salary would be
paid to an employee if they were not given two weeks' prior notice of termination. See
id. On September 17, 1971, Brunswick agreed to sell its Concorde Yacht Division·to
Test Corporation. As part of the agreement, Brunswick was not able to induce or to
recruit personnel of the Concorde Division to remain in the employ of Brunswick. Fur
ther, Test Corporation was required to continue Brunswick's policies with respect to
severance and vacation pay. See id. at 224. The plaintiffs accepted positions with Test
Corporation and were paid the same salaries that they received from Brunswick. Test
Corporation also continued Brunswick's policies with respect to severance pay, vaca
tion pay, and two weeks pay in lieu of prior notice of termination. See id. However, on
April 27, 1972, Test Corporation closed its doors on account of insolvency. After Test
Corporation closed its doors, the plaintiffs filed suit to recover lost compensation from
Brunswick. See id. The trial court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to severance
pay based on the meaning of the policy statement, but that the plaintiffs were barred
from recovery because they entered into a novation with Test Corporation and this
novation released Brunswick from its responsibility to compensate the plaintiffs. See id.
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An employment manual that addresses severance and reemploy
ment rights may be held to alter the at-will status of an employment
agreement, creating a "contractual obligation[ ] when, with knowl
edge of their existence, employees start or continue to work for the
employer."156 Moreover, some jurisdictions have concluded that
employee handbooks or policy manuals containing express or im
plied promises may create a binding contract. 157
Courts have also held that policy statements indicating that laid
off employees would be given first opportunity to fill new job open
ings are enforceable against the employer.158 When a company has
at 227. The Court of Appeals of Maryland disagreed with the trial court and found that
a novation did not exist and that the employees were entitled to compensation from
Brunswick. See id. at 228, 230.
156. Id. at 224.
157. See Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 371 S.E.2d 46, 52 (W. Va. 1988) (citing
Cook v. Heck's Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986». In Collins, the plaintiff alleged
"that he had been laid off and subse'quently discharged by [Elkay] in retaliation for his
refusal to 'falsify certain safety reports' pertaining to a safety inspection at [Elkay's]
preparation plant where he was employed, and for his refusal to otherwise violate fed
eral or State mine safety laws." Id. at 47. Aside from the wrongful discharge claim
based on a violation of public policy, the employee brought a breach of contract claim
against his employer. See id. at 51-52. The breach of contract claim was based on the
employee's belief that he was to hold his position until retirement, so long as he per
formed his job duties competently and satisfactorily. See id. at 51. Collins alleged that
said belief was a result of various publications of Elkay, which promised him and his
family financial security until retirement. See id. The court stated the following:
A promise of job security contained in an employee handbook distributed by
an employer to its employees constitutes an offer for a unilateral contract; and
an employee's continuing to work, while under no obligation to do so, consti
tutes an acceptance and sufficient consideration to make the employer's prom
ise binding and enforceable .
. . . An employee handbook may form the basis of a unilateral contract if
there is a definite promise therein by the employer not to discharge covered
employees except for specified reasons.
Id. However, the dissenting justice in Collins noted that "[e]ven in states that recognize
implied employment contracts, an agreement for 'satisfactory performance' is not en
forceable because it is a purely subjective term measured by the employer." Id. at 52
(Brotherton, J., dissenting).
158. See Hepp v. Lockheed-Cal. Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 408, 410-11 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978). Hepp was employed by Lockheed as a "Procurement Price Cost Administrator,
Labor Grade 7," a salaried position which was considered management. Id. at 409.
After working in the procurement department for over nine years, Hepp's group was
"surplused" and he was "laid off suitable for rehire." Id. Hepp was told that the layoff
was caused by an excessive number of workers and had no reflection on his work qual
ity, and that he would eventually be called back to work. See id. Lockheed had a well
established policy of hiring back those employees who were laid off within the past two
years and were qualified for the recently-vacated position before Lockheed would fill
the position by promotion, transfer within the company, or by a new employee. See id.
However, during the two year period following Hepp's layoff, six openings occurred for
which Hepp was qualified and each time Lockheed overlooked Hepp's availability. See
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a well-established policy for rehiring former/laid-off employees, the
policy will be deemed "not merely a guideline for the benefit of
management but a positive inducement for employees to take and
continue employment with [the company]."lS9 Any necessary con
sideration to be given by the employee in order for a contract to be
formed would manifest itself in employees foregoing their rights to
seek other employment based on the representations made in the
form of employer policies. 160 Accordingly, it is recommended that
severance and reemployment clauses not be included in employee
handbooks.
Courts often rely on written materials provided by the em
ployer to its employees when finding that contractual terms exist in
an employment relationship. A court need not, however, limit itself
only to written documents to determine the existence of an employ
ment agreement. In certain instances, courts may also look to the
words or actions of the parties when determining whether an em
ployment contract exists between the employer and the employee.
VI.

ORAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACfS

In general, all contracts must be in writing.161 However, a con
tract may also be created orally, so long as the contract is not for a
fixed term greater than one year.1 62 Courts have defined the "per
id. Hepp sued for breach of the layoff policy and Lockheed defended, arguing that the
"policies ... are not a part of plaintiffs employment contract because they are not
intended for his benefit and he did not give consideration for them." Id.
159. Id. at 411.
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 259, § 1 (1996). Section 1 provides the
following:
No action shall be brought:
First, to charge an executor or administrator, or an assignee under an insolvent
law of the commonwealth, upon a special promise to answer damages out of
his own estate;
Second, to charge a person upon a special promise to answer for the debt,
default or misdoings of another;
Third, upon an agreement made upon consideration of marriage;
Fourth, upon a contract for the sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments or of
any interest in or concerning them; or
Fifth, upon an agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the
making thereof;
Unless the promise, contract or agreement upon which such action is brought,
or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to
be charged therewith or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.
Id.
162. See CORBIN, supra note 1, § 444, at 446 (noting that the Statute of Frauds
provides that "[nlo action shall be brought ... upon any agreement that is not to be
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formance within one year" provision such that an employer should
proceed with caution when making oral promises to a present or
prospective employee.
For instance, in Whelan v. Integraph Corp. ,163 the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that an
oral lifetime employment contract is not barred by the Statute of
Frauds. l64 In Whelan, the defendant strongly recruited the plaintiff
to be its New England district manager.1 65 During the recruitment
process, the prospective employee, who was now the plaintiff, was
assured that "he could count on a long-term commitment from the
defendant."166 The plaintiff accepted the job offer and was subse
quently terminated six months later. 167 The plaintiff then sued, al
leging that the employer breached the lifetime employment
contract.168 The defendant, however, argued that the contract was
unenforceable because it was both for a term longer than one year
and not in writing.169 However, the court held that the Statute of
Frauds did not apply because the contract could have been per
formed within one year. 170 The court supported its holding by not
ing that "[b]ecause [the plaintiff's] contract was for permanent
employment, it could have been performed within one year: [the
plaintiff] could have died or [the defendant] could have discontin
ued its business, at which point its obligation to employ [the plain
tiff] would end. "171
However, it is quite different when the oral contract states a
specific time at which the employment will end. In Powers v. Bos
ton Cooper Corp.,172 the oral contract began in 1960 when the
plaintiff was thirty two years 01d. 173 The oral contract established
that the plaintiff would work for the defendant until the age of sev
performed within the space of one year from the making thereof" (alteration in
original».
163. 889 F. Supp. 15 (D. Mass. 1995).
164. See id. at 17. See supra note 162 for the relevant language of the Statute of
Frauds.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Boothby v. Texon, Inc., 414 Mass. 468,
479, 608 N.E.2d 1028, 1035-36 (1993».
172. 926 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1991).
173. See id. at 110.
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enty.174 The plaintiff, however, was terminated at the age of fifty
nine. 175 The plaintiff then filed suit, alleging that his termination
before the age of seventy was a breach of the oral employment con
tractp6 The court held that since the contract could not have been
performed in one year, the contract was unenforceable pursuant to
the Statute of Frauds. 177 Thus, where an oral contract is general in
nature, the contract will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds.
However, when the contract specifies a specific period of employ
ment, the contract must be in writing.
Employment relationships often bring exceptions to the Stat
ute of Frauds into play. The first exception worth noting is the
Doctrine of Promissory EstoppelP8 Massachusetts courts first rec
ognized this doctrine in Cellucci v. Sun COP9 In Cellucci, the court
recognized three elements for finding promissory estoppel:
(1) [a] representation or conduct amounting to a representation
intended to induce a course of conduct on the part of the person
to whom the representation is made; (2) [a]n act or omission re
sulting from the representation, whether actual or by conduct, by
the person to whom the representation is made; [and] (3)
[d]etriment to such person as a consequence of the act or
omission. 180

This three-part test has since been applied in the context of employ
ment relationships.181 In Hoffman v. Optima Systems, Inc.,182 the
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 111.
178. "A promise which the promisor would reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the
action of forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the statute of frauds if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is
to be limited as justice requires." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(1)
(1981).
179. 2 Mass. App. Ct. 722, 320 N.E.2d 919 (1974). In Cellucci, the plaintiff and
defendant had negotiated for the sale of a parcel of land, but the defendant subse
quently purchased from a different vendor. See id. at 723-27, 320 N.E.2d at 921-23. The
plaintiff then sued for breach of a land sale contract. The defendant claimed the Statute
of Frauds as an affirmative defense, asserting that since the agreement was not in writ
ing it was unenforceable. See id. at 727, 320 N.E.2d at 923. The court found the con
tract to be enforceable based on the plaintiff's reliance on statements made by the
defendant. See id. at 729, 320 N.E.2d at 924.
180. Id. at 728, 320 N.E.2d at 923.
181. See generally Frederick v. Conagra, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass. 1989);
Hoffman v. Optima Sys., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 865 (D. Mass. 1988); Presto v. Sequoia Sys.,
Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Mass. 1986).
182. 683 F. Supp. 865 (D. Mass. 1988).
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plaintiff worked for Polaroid when the defendants approached him
to work for their company.183 The plaintiff was promised that he
would be "Vice President of Engineering and would be a full princi
pal of Optima."I84 The plaintiff, relying on that promise, resigned
from Polaroid and accepted the position at Optima,185 During his
employment at Optima, the plaintiff was not paid the full amount
for his services rendered, was not paid according to the market
value for his position, and was not reimbursed for $7,500 worth of
equipment which he had purchased with his own money for the
benefit of the company.186 These problems caused him to resign
and subsequently sue for breach of the employment contract. 187
The defendant moved to dismiss the suit arguing that the contract
was not in writing and thus violated the Statute of Frauds. 188 The
court refused to dismiss the suit, finding that the "allegations, which
[were] accepted as true for the purpose of this motion, [were] suffi
cient to show that Hoffman relied on the promises of Optima ... to
his detriment. "189 Thus, the court held that the defendants were
estopped from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense,19o
The second exception to the Statute of Frauds recognized in
Massachusetts courts is quantum meruit. 191 Quantum meruit is the
measure of damages used when the plaintiff seeks payment for
services rendered. 192 In order to recover in quantum meruit, one
must show that (i) the plaintiff bestowed a "measurable" benefit to
the defendant, (ii) the defendant accepted the benefit bestowed
"with the expectation of compensating the plaintiff," and (iii) the
plaintiff expected to be compensated for these services. 193 Once
shown, a plaintiff may recover the value of his services rendered,
despite a failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds. 194 The fact
183. See id. at 867.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 869.
189. Id. at 870.
190. See id.
191. See generally Bolen v. Paragon Plastics, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 103 (D. Mass.
1990).
192. See id. at 106.
193. Id. at 106-07.
194. See Green v. Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 49-50, 337 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1975),
abrogated on other grounds by Wilcox v. Trautz, 427 Mass. 326, 693 N.E.2d 141 (1998);
see also Heil v. McCann, 360 Mass. 507, 511, 275 N.E.2d 889, 892 (1971) ("One who has
rendered valuable services pursuant to an oral contract, which cannot be enforced on
account of the statute of frauds, may recover the fair value of the services rendered.").
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finder will be responsible for determining whether these elements
have been met. 195 Therefore, although employers may often use
the statute of frauds as a defense to oral contracts, caution must
nonetheless be employed when engaging in discussions which may
be perceived as setting forth contractual terms.
CONCLUSION

The intricacies of labor and employment law, both at the fed
eral and state level, dictate that employers must use care to commu
nicate clearly, fairly, and legally with potential applicants, actual
applicants, and employees. Various laws concerning the employ
ment relationship dictate a number of obligations that the employer
has to current and prospective employees. The employer's failure
to act in accordance with these various laws may cause unantici
pated legal liability. However, an employer's best defense may very
well be a good offense. In this respect, it is crucial that employers
seek legal counsel before taking any action which has the potential
to create, affect, alter, or terminate current and future employment
relationships.
Advertisements, applications, employment contracts, employ
ment manuals, and employment procedures can all have a signifi
cant impact on the employment relationship. From the employer's
perspective, it is important that the employment relationship be re
duced to a detailed document which minimizes the potential for un
certainty and misunderstanding in the future.

195.

See Green, 369 Mass. at 53, 337 N.E.2d at 696.

